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altogether different from their permitting the operation of a
complete American judicial process on their sovereign soil. 36 It
would be possible to surrender the offender to the host country
for trial, but his offense might not be considered criminal in the
host country. If the host country had notions of justice contrary
to those of the United States, a release of the accused to it for
trial might encounter "due process" difficulties.8 7 It is evident,
then, that the instant case in effect has furnished a challenge to
both Congress and the Executive to find some manner of trying
the offenses of civilians connected with the military overseas.
A. Clayton James, Jr.
CONTRACTS - LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING, ZONING
ORDINANCE AS GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF OPTION
Plaintiff agency brought suit to recover a sum paid for an
option to purchase a certain city lot. The neighborhood in which
the property was located was apparently industrial. The lot it-
self contained a filling station and across the street was an iron
works establishment. At the time the option was purchased
plaintiff intended a particular commercial use for the property
which was in keeping with the appearance of the neighborhood,
but later learned that this use was prohibited by a zoning ordi-
nance.1 The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal,
held, reversed. In view of the character of the neighborhood and
the fact that the vendor was aware of the use to which the plain-
36. The receiving state has retained its primary right to try offenses committed
against its nationals by United States servicemen and their dependents. See 4
U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1792, art. IV, para. 3(b), T.I.A.S. No. 2846, June 19, 1951 (effec-
tive August 23, 1953). To say the least, it would be a considerable strain upon na-
tional pride to allow American judges, lawyers, and juries the power to function on
foreign soil. Moreover, provision would have to be made for a criminal code, and
it would not be possible to issue compulsory process against witnesses and docu-
ments. The difficult task of impaneling a jury would be ever present. If it were
composed of foreign nationals, this would be little better than releasing the ac-
cused to the host country for prosecution. If civilian dependents compose the jury,
might not the possibility of "command influence" be as prevalent as in courts-
martial? See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
37. "In Saudi Arabia the King has absolute power of life or death over the
people. If an American soldier were 'tried' in that country, it would be doubtful
that a treaty authorizing the application of those standards of justice would find
favor with an American. . . . In view of the fact that Article 12 of the French
Code Penal requires the use of the guillotine, it is interesting to speculate as to
whether that instrument would meet due process requirements." Note, 18 LouISI-
ANA LAW Raviw 173, n. 20 (1957).
1. The area was zoned as "industrial non-conforming." The building could not
be substantially changed for commercial purposes and after six months non-use
would become a location for residential structures only.
NOTES
tiff intended to put the property, rescission of the contract can
be had either because of the defendant's failure to disclose the
restrictions, or because of the vendee's error of fact. Boehmer
Sales Agency v. Russo, 99 So.2d 475 (La. App. 1958)
In the common law jurisdictions of other states, restrictions
imposed on property by deed or covenant entitle the prospective
vendee who has entered an executory contract for the purchase of
real estate to reject the title and recover his deposit when it ap-
pears that such restrictions were unknown to the vendee.2 The
rule is based on the principle that a vendor is obligated to deliver
a good and marketable title free of encumbrances.3 However,
restrictions imposed by municipal authority will not support a
rejection of title. 4 This different treatment seems to be based
on the idea that zoning restrictions, like state housing acts and
laws as to sanitation and quarantine, are but a part of the large
volume of legislation restricting and affecting property,5 and as
such, are presumably within the scope of public knowledge. The
Louisiana jurisprudence is in harmony with the common law in
allowing rejection of title where the property is burdened with
restrictions imposed by deed or covenant." The result has been
reached by holding that such a title is suggestive of litigation
(and presumably unmarketable) , or that title restrictions are
analogous to a nonapparent servitudes and, as such, must be dis-
closed by-the vendor.9 Only two Louisiana cases have been found
that deal with the subject of zoning ordinances as affecting title,
2. Kittinger v. Rossman, 12 Del. Ch. 228, 110 Atl. 677 (1920) ; Bertola v.
Allred, 46 Cal. App. 593, 189 Pac. 489 (1920) ; Shea & McGuire v. Evans, 109
Md. 299, 72 Atl. 600 (1909) ; Ray v. Adams, 44 App. Div. 173, 59 N.Y. Supp.
1047 (1899) ; Batley v. Foerderer, 162 Pa. 460, 29 Atl. 868 (1894) ; McDERMOTT,
LAND TITLES AND LAND LAW 27 (1954); MAUPIN, MARKETABLE TITLE TO REAL
ESTATE 300 (2d ed. 1907) ; Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1414 (1928). See PATRON, TITLES
560 (2d ed. 1957).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. Lohmeyer v. Bower, 170 Kan. 442, 227 P.2d 102 (1951) ; Hall v. Risley, 188
Ore. 69, 213 P.2d 818 (1950) ; Lasker v. Patrovsky, 264 Wis. 589, 60 N.W.2d 336
(1953) ; Miller v. Milwaukee Odd Fellows Temple, 206 Wis. 547, 240 N.W. 193
(1932) ; MCDERMOTT, LAND TITLES AND LAND LAW 27 (1954) ; PATTON, TITLES
568 (2d ed. 1957). But 8ee Kittinger v. Rossman, 12 Del. Ch. 276, 112 Atl. 388
(1921) ; Daniel v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 582, 44 N.E. 991 (1896).
5. PATTON, TITLES 1038 (1st ed. 1938).
6. Williams v. Meyer, 29 So.2d 599 (La. App. 1947) ; Bolian v. Porehe, 149
So. 272 (La. App. 1933) ; Giacoma v. Yochim, 13 La. App. 94, 126 So. 84 (1930);
Couret v. Hopkins-Rhodes and Co., 13 Orl. App. 161 (La. App. 1916).
7. Giacoma v. Yochim, 13 La. App. 94, 126 So. 84 (1930).
8. Couret v. Hopkins-Rhodes and Co., 13 Orl. App. 161 (1916).
9. LA. CrvIL CODE art. 2515 (1870): "[I]f the servitudes be of such impor-
tance that there is cause to presume that the buyer would not have contracted, if
he had been aware of the incumbrance, he may claim the canceling of the contract,
should he not prefer to have an indemnification." This article applies to executed
1958]
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and then, only by way of dicta. In Oatis v. Delcuze'° the court
stated that the mere existence of zoning regulations does not
create an encumbrance upon title to property, but the existing
violation of restrictive ordinances does constitute an encum-
brance which affects the merchantability of the title." The other
case discussing the subject is Stauss v. Kober.12 There the plain-
tiff vendor contended that certain undisclosed restrictions in his
title were less onerous than zoning ordinances involving the same
property and hence, since the vendee would have been more
limited in his use of the property by virtue of the ordinances,
he should therefore be made to accept title even with such restric-
tions. 3 The plaintiff's entire argument was in keeping with the
common law. 14 In its discussion of the case the court stated,
without seeming authority, that it accepted as a "well settled
principle" that where a person agrees to purchase real estate,
he will be held to have made the agreement subject to any exist-
ing zoning laws or ordinances, even when he was unaware of
their existence.' 5 But then the court held for the defendant-
vendee, allowing rejection of title, basing its decision on those
cases which hold that undisclosed title restrictions justify rejec-
tion.' 6
It is interesting to note that none of the prior Louisiana cases
allowing rejection of title for title restrictions used error or
fraud as grounds for rejection. 1 7 This seems strange in view of
the apparent applicability of the code articles dealing with error
and fraud. Consent is a necessary element of a contract and con-
sent is deemed in law to be nonexistent where it has been pro-
duced by error or fraud.1 8 Error is of two kinds: fact and law.19
To vitiate consent the error must affect a principal cause or mo-
tive of the contract.20 The principal cause is defined as that
without which the contract would not have been made. 21 Yet to
sales, but it is submitted that it would be used in cases of contracts to sell also in
order to avoid circuity of action.
10. 226 La. 751, 77 So.2d 28 (1954).
11. 226 La. at 757, 77 So.2d at 30.
12. 51 So.2d 121 (La. App. 1951).
13. Id. at 122.
14. Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919); Utah v. Dickinson,
82 N.Y. Supp.2d 356 (1948) ;Annot., 57 A.L.R. 1424 (1928).
15. Stauss v. Kober, 51 So.2d 121, 122 (La. App. 1951).
16. See cases cited note 6 8upra.
17. See cases cited note 6 supra.
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1819 (1870).
19. Id. art. 1820.
20. Id. art. 1823.
21. Id. art. 1825.
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NOTES
give reasonable and just protection to the other party, the Code
further provides that if the error is to be fatal he must have
been apprised of the materiality of the motive, or, because of the
nature of the transaction, it must be presumed that he knew it.22
In the instant case the same spokesman for the court which
delivered the opinion in the Stauss case held that the zoning
ordinance objected to constituted a defect of such import as to
justify a rescission of the contract where the vendee was ignorant
of the ordinance. In so holding, the court relied on the code pro-
visions dealing with error as affecting the principal cause.2 3 It
was stated by the court that the principal cause for the making of
the contract in the instant case was the desire of the purchaser
to use it for a certain purpose and that if he had known that he
could not so use it, he would not have purchased the option. The
court then held that the vendee had been under an error of fact.
It was pointed out that the vendor was aware of the use to which
the purchaser wished to put the property, and that it was im-
possible to determine the existence of such a zoning ordinance
from ordinary inspection. The court reasoned alternatively that
though a vendee who buys a piece of property in an obviously
residential neghborhood, intending to use it for commercial pur-
poses, may be under a duty to ascertain whether he can so use
it, in a case where the property and the surrounding area is pres-
ently being put to the use which the vendee intends, he is justi-
fied in believing that it is zoned unconditionally for such use. In
the latter case the vendor is under a duty to make known the
exact status of the property. The court relied on Carpenter v.
Skinner,24 which allowed the rescission of a contract to buy on
the grounds that the vendee was under an error of fact as to
the nature of the neighborhood which affected his principal mo-
tive. There the court similarly held that where an ordinary in-
spection does not reveal the nature of the neighborhood, the
vendee is not under a duty to investigate official records to deter-
mine its character.
In thus basing its decision on error of fact the court reached
a sound result.25 The evidence indicated that the vendor was
22. Id. art. 1826.
23. Id. arts. 1819, 1820, 1823.
24. 224 La. 848, 71 So.2d 133 (1954).
25. It might be argued that the vendee's ignorance of the zoning ordinance
was an error of law. The vendee was aware of the actual facts as to the nature
of the neighborhood and former use to which the property had been put, but he
erroneously concluded from these that the zoning laws would permit the property
to be used as were the surrounding properties. The result, however, would be the
19581
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aware of the intended use of the property, but it did not disclose
whether the defendant-vendor knew of the particular zoning
ordinance which would have prevented its use. Had the vendor
possessed such knowledge, the case would seem to have fallen
under the provisions of the Code dealing with fraud,2 6 and the
contract would have been voidable. Even assuming that the de-
fendant did not know of the ordinance and that both parties
were merely in error, the result would be the same,27 because the
error was as to the principal cause. Thus, it would seem that
realization of the vendee's belief that the property could be used
as intended without the interference of zoning restrictions might
be considered a tacit condition to the enforcement of the con-
tract.2
8
In holding that a prospective vendee is not obliged to investi-
gate zoning restrictions except where the appearance of the
neighborhood should put him on notice of the possibility of
restrictions which would preclude the intended use, the court
adopted a realistic and desirable approach. It is often imprac-
tical and difficult for a prospective vendee to determine the
existence of such ordinances, and, in addition, the vendor, by
virtue of his possession and ownership, is more apt to have been
informed of their existence.
Maurice J. Naquin
LABOR LAW - THE PERENNIAL PREEMPTION PROBLEM
Plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract in a state
court for wrongful expulsion from the defendant union, and
asked for restoration of membership and damages for loss of
wages and for mental suffering. Defendant conceded the state
court jurisdiction to order plaintiff's reinstatement, but con-
tended that the Taft-Hartley Act left the state without power
to fill out this remedy by an award of damages for loss of wages
and mental suffering. The lower court gave judgment for the
plaintiff on both issues. The court of appeals affirmed and the
State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing. On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The state
same, for Article 1846, dealing with error of law, specifically provides a means of
recovering what has been given or paid under error of law.
26. See LA. CIVM CODE art. 1847(5), (6) (1870).
27. See id. art. 1819 et seq.
28. See id. arts. 1824, 1827.
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